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Once a Tiger - Always a Tiger M.R. Narayan Swamy This is an overview of the LTTE as it stands today, facing as it does the most serious military challenge from any Sri Lankan government since the Tamil drive for separation caught global attention a quarter century ago. The gravity of the crisis is compounded by an unprecedented international isolation the Tigers confront in a world where terrorism and terror acts enjoy no respect, whatever the cause. This is not a history of the group even in a limited sense. It captures the rise of the LTTE – so to say – in the run up to the 2002 Norway-brokered truce and in the years that followed before it ran into serious difficulties on account of a variety of factors - internal and external. This study, based on published and other sources, dwells on the predicaments the Tigers are in and the likely course the never-say-die organization may pursue.
Now Tigers with Wings R.Venkataraman LTTE has mercilessly wiped out fellow guerilla groups. In fact the number of Tamils killed by the LTTE would outnumber the ones killed by the Sri Lankan forces. Tamil moderates as well former militants turned political workers would say that the LTTE is a fascist organization wanting to establish a single group rule at gun point. The Tamils in the island are keeping quiet out of fear and once a multi party Tamil democratic set up takes a shape a majority is sure to oppose the LTTE.
Tamil Tigers are Airborne Ajey Lele It is likely that LTTE may espouse Interdiction model that aims at the opponents’ military vulnerabilities. The basic assumption of this model is that coercive leverage could be secured by attacking rear area military targets. Here the aim is to defuse the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear on the battlefield. Aerial interdiction sometimes includes economic targets to the extent that these are assumed to be part of the opponent’s ‘war machine.’ All the air attacks done by LTTE so far indicate that it wants to target Sri Lankan military establishments and infrastructure. It appears that in future too, it is likely to look for similar targets. From Indian perspective this new addition in LTTE’s military arsenal is a problem. It was also reported that its capacity to attack from air even poses a danger to India’s nuclear installations located in southern part of the country. The emergence of LTTE’s air wing may not pose a real threat to India but the need of the hour is to remain cautious.
High time to Discipline the LTTE Abhilash In the process India will be delinking two issues: terrorism and protecting the interests of Sri Lankan Tamils in unified Sri Lanka. Indian policy has to be recast in terms of defeating terrorism and violence at any cost any where in India and in the neighbourhood. Now it has been universally accepted that LTTE is a terrorist organisation and it should be made to disarm itself and come to the conference table. At another level, Sri Lankan government should be persuaded to come out with its devolution of powers package at the earliest. Such an approach will send right signals to other terrorist organisations in the region. If we accept the theories of counter terrorism, the life span of a terrorist organisation would be a decade plus; and LTTE has crossed that period. Now its clout is declining. Is it not the time to discipline the LTTE?
Ethnic Conflict and the Failing Peace Process in Sri Lanka Manohari Velamati The Ceasefire Agreement, signed between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in February 2002, led to a fresh attempt to make peace in the conflict-ridden island nation. After six rounds of peace sessions, a stalemate appeared with the LTTE unilaterally suspending the peace talks in 2003. Though there has been a leadership change in the government with a different political party coming into power in 2005, the CFA was not terminated. The last direct talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil Tigers were held in October 2006. These talks in Geneva ended without reaching any results. Since then there has been an interruption in the talks between the two parties.
In Pursuit of Elusive Peace N. Manoharan Peace in Sri Lanka has been elusive. The recent edition of peace process in Sri Lanka commenced with the announcement of cessation of hostilities by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) in December 2001. Formal ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the antagonists was signed on 22 February 2002. CFA stands until today but only on paper. During the entire period of the peace process, covering half a decade, the two antagonists – the GOSL and the LTTE – met face to face only for eight times, the last two of which were on implementation of CFA. The peace process, which started of well, slipped down to the level of saving the CFA and practically ended abruptly. Lethargic peace process led to the failure of CFA; CFA on its part let down the peace process. The current situation can best be described as “undeclared war”.
Peace: Through Power Devolution in Sri Lanka Vinod F. Khobragade The present ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is not amongst the common Tamil and Sinhalese masses as the previous days, but it is bracketed between the LTTE and the Government as well as stubborn Sinhalese and Tamils. This is not the problem particularly of Sinhalese or Tamils or Muslims, but it has encircled the entire population which is tired of violence, and is dreaming of peaceful habitation. The need of an hour is that the moderate and rational people of Sri Lanka from all the communities Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims must change their attitudes leaving the chauvinistic, obstinate and ardent feelings of hatredness against each other. There must be a feeling and acceptance of every one as Sri Lankan rather than We Sinhalese or We Tamils or some one else and must move forward in tandem to resolve the prolonged conflicts. They must pursue inter socio-cultural activities collectively. As the peace processes between the government and the LTTE are continuously collapsing, all the Sri Lankan need to develop feeling of ‘oneness’ from the ground level where true Sri Lankan resides and they must initiate peace processes amongst themselves at their level, then only the experiments like devolution of powers and other issues would be worthy to resolve the ethnic problem and, the final compromising and conducive settlement for all would be brought. Besides this, all the Sri Lankan including Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims must support all the efforts of President for the implementation of power devolution.
India’s Changing Policy towards Sri Lanka Prof. P. Sahadevan Realising the constraints and costs of its direct intervention, ideally India’s policy should combine ‘non-intervention’ with ‘active interest’ in the ethnic conflict. Its decision not to intervene directly should not mean that it is disinterested in the conflict process and its outcome. The assumption is that India should be able to control the conflict process and influence the adversaries without physically getting involved if it remains responsive to the developments and actively associates itself with those who regularly interact with the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. While counselling and, if necessary, coercing the two adversaries through tough policy statements, directives and postures, India should strengthen the international community’s crucial war-prevention and peacemaking role. The presence of some influential international actors in Sri Lanka provides a conduit for India to influence the behaviour and position of both adversaries.
TAMIL NADU AND THE SRI LANKAN ETHNIC CRISIS M. Mayilvaganan Sri Lanka is in turmoil again and there has been an escalation in armed encounters between Sri Lankan security forces and the LTTE. The conflict in Sri Lanka affects India’s domestic politics, because of the presence of same ethnicity across the Palk Strait who share language and cultural patterns with the Tamils in India. As a result of this inextricable ethnic linkage of the people of Tamil Nadu with Tamils of Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu’s domestic politics has become a key factor in determining India’s policy towards Sri Lanka. The spontaneous and strong reactions by the Tamil Nadu political parties and public to the Sri Lankan government’s military offensive on the Tamil areas in North and East and especially on the attack on Sencholai orphanage centre indicated that the Sri Lankan Tamil problem, has resurfaced as an significant determinant of domestic politics in India. The paper argues that the turmoil in Sri Lanka and its impact on Tamil Nadu will affect India’s security interests as the Central government can neither afford to see the State slide into anarchy nor can it see some pro-LTTE groups acting contrary to its interests, strengthening the LTTE’s foothold in the State by taking advantage of large scale influx of refugees to India |
