|
Indocentric view |
|
Home | About us | Contact Us | Subscribe | FAQs |
|
The US In South Asia: An Over View Chintamani Mahapatra There are four schools of thoughts in India, which have divergent views on the desirability of Indo-US strategic partnership. The nationalists are concerned that the budding defence and security relations with India will compromise India’s sovereignty. The isolationists do not see any virtue in building bridges to a country that is distant, highly commercial in its attitude and does not understand the complexity of the Indian society. The Left Parties have an aversion to Indo-US joint efforts to handle the uncertain evolution of a rising China. Despite the economic policy of the Chinese Government, the Communist Party in China is still supreme. The Left Parties abhor the idea of US eliminating the remnant pockets of communism from the surface of earth. Some Left leaders want India to follow the Chinese pattern of engaging the US. Finally, the mainstream Indian political parties, both BJP and the Congress, have embraced the policy of closer and comprehensive relationship with the United States. Besides the state-to-state relations, the mutual friendship and cooperation between the civil societies of South Asia and the US are essential for the longevity of the current pattern of US engagement of this region. International relations, as evidenced by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nuclearisation of South Asia and 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, are anything but predictable. Sustaining a healthy, friendly and mutually beneficial relationship requires consistent efforts by the governments as well as civil societies of the concerned countries.
US-Sri Lanka Relations: Recent Trends And Evaluation Monika Chansoria After wrapping up his three-day official visit to the country on May 10, 2007, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher said that US was concerned about the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka and would continue its military cooperation to fight the threat of terrorism. Assistant Secretary Boucher said the Sri Lankan government “has every right to stop those airplanes from hurting and killing people and damaging the interests of the island.” Moreover, reiterating his government’s support to fight the Tiger terrorism Boucher said “…the US with the international community will take every action possible to prevent the Tamil Tigers from being able to raise money and buy arms.’ An emerging sense makes it imperative to mention here that the LTTE is rapidly moving towards quashing the possibility, if any, of a negotiated solution to the protracted crisis. By indulging in activities such as air strikes, assassinations and suicide bombings, the LTTE is underscoring its character as an organization firm in its resolve to indulge in terror tactics and justifying their designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The future of Sri Lanka’s political and economic status primarily depends on political stability, return to peace, and continued policy reforms. This certainly would be a daunting task since the vicious civil war and associated political and social unrest has tarnished what could prospectively have been a bright future. Any implicit analysis would have to comprehend that even though the US may stress on endeavours to re-initiate the peace process, the core issues to the predicament and the outcome of conflict resolution will fall primarily on the Sri-Lankan administration and the LTTE whose deep-rooted distrust fuels the tensions further. Finally, it is the plight of the civilian population that makes the continual demands for potential peace most relevant.
US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS Dr. Sanjay Mohanty The long history of US-Pakistan relationship has followed an uneven course with several ups and downs. During the Cold War period, the relationship was evidently and fundamentally flawed by the divergent objectives of the alliance partners. However, despite occasional frustrations both in Washington and Islamabad, the relationship did not completely break down. But the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and the consequent US-led anti-terrorism campaign dramatically transformed the US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan has once again become a “front-line” state in the US-led global war against international terrorism. President Musharraf – under strong US diplomatic pressure – has offered President Bush, Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the light against terrorism”. Because of its proximity to Afghanistan and earlier close ties with the Taliban, Pakistan is considered as a ‘pivotal ally’ to the US-led mission to root out terrorism in the region General Musharraf was suddenly elevated to the position of a hero by the Bush Administration, once he decided to join the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Nonetheless, there are marked differences between Washington and Islamabad over some of the major issues like terrorism, WMD proliferation and democratization, which continue to cloud present and future US-Pakistan engagement. The relationship continues to be constrained by the US concerns about Pakistan’s clandestine rolein nuclear proliferation, cross-border terrorism in India, and perceived undemocratic practices by the Musharraf government. Nevertheless, in the US strategic calculation, Musharraf is the best bet for furthering US interests in the prevailing conditions. The US is seeking to make a commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan is committed to combating extremism and a policy of “enlightened moderation”. But ultimately, the future course of the current US-Pakistan engagement will largely depend on the emerging priorities of the US and the extent to which the Musharraf government will fulfill its commitment. Only time will tell how long the current relationship between US and Pakistan will continue.
US Role In Afghanistan: Endless Road and Unknown Destination The US war on terror that began with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2002 has not ended with the ouster of the Taliban regime in Kabul. The US involvement is only getting deeper and the scope of its interests there, wider. For the US to ensure that the success of the OEF does not become futile, it is not left with many options but to prolong its stay in Afghanistan until political, economic stability is ensured and a semblance of normalcy in the security situation is restored. However, this predicament of achieving stability has diversified the US policy towards Afghanistan towards several interwoven issues and a set back to any one of these would render the progress in the others dissipated. .
The U.S.-Nepal Relationship Priyadarshini Panda The U.S. has been using Nepal to certain extent as an instrument to pursue its grand strategy of becoming a great power. Even after the cold war it does not want to take any risk. Specifically, the South Asian region poses a challenge to the U.S. in matters of security and strategy due to different reasons mentioned earlier. Therefore, the U.S. would continue some of its previous policies in Nepal as best suited to its interests. The U.S. believes that the Nepalese government (though autocratic) is the strongest challenge to the Maoist uprising. Despite the contentious happenings of 2001, the U.S. government stood firmly by the Nepali government and throne. Now, a question comes to mind: would the United States have enhanced its concerned interest in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency had the tragic events of September 11, 2001 not occurred. After the signing of the peace agreement (Comprehensive Peace Arms Management Accord, November 2006) between the government and the Maoists in Nepal, 11 years of political chaos and social instability appear to have come to an end. However, while the dates have been fixed on 22 November for elections, there is no end to the incidents of killings, extortions, rapes and other heinous crimes. The U.S. is deeply concerned regarding the free and fairness of coming election. The U.S. has been unhappy over the inclusion of Maoists in the government without their agreeing to abandon violence. It should be noted that while the US assistance is very modest, Nepal’s present difficulties are real.
US: Looking for a new Regime Pinaki Bhattacharya Even after Gen HM Ershad had taken to economic liberalization in a big way during his regime and had parceled out the country’s public sector units to private predators, and despite Begum Khaleda continuing in the same path, the US prognosis remains that Bangladesh is a “protectionist” country. “The Bangladeshi economy has been described as ‘mostly unfree,’ as a result of high levels of trade protectionism and regulation, and an extensive black market economy,” the CRS report says.1 Of course, there is reason for this ire. The country, like its much larger neighbour, has successfully depoliticised ‘Development’ despite so much rivalry between the two leaders of the two contending parties. So Sheikh Hasina, in government, followed the same ‘reform’ path that Begum Khaleda had walked. But she was not successful. Because, “bureaucratic delays andlabor union resistance have hindered implementation of many reforms, including major privatization efforts. Moreover, crippling strikes led by both major political parties when out of power have resulted in a loss of foreign investor confidence.”2 Clearly, something is amiss somewhere. May be the Bangladeshis in 2008 would have a similar thing to say like their counterparts in India of 2004. Only, their action is more fraught with danger. Because their other options lie with the Islamists.
Uneasy Partners: Recent Trends In Indo-US Relations Dr. Saumyajit Ray Though it was the certificate from the US Administration—and the US Congress—as a strong, stable, and successful democracy that helped India clinch the nuclear deal with the United States, apprehensions still exist among members of the US Congress—who now form part of the Democratic majority—that the nuclear agreement would actually allow India to significantly increase the number of its nuclear weapons, justify further proliferation, and make India unaccountable for clandestinely enhancing its nuclear arsenal. The Democratic majority in the 110th Congress has little chance of being voted out in the 111th. Chances of a Republican succeeding President Bush also seem slim at the moment. In that case, India would need to build bridges with those sections within the US Congress that have remained unconvinced about the need for the “peaceful” nuclear Act, even if many of them may have voted for it due to party whips in its favor. The importance of India as a “strategic partner” is not lost on Representatives and Senators, regardless of party affiliation. Foreign policy bosses in New Delhi should never forget that if India had domestic compulsions, so did the United States.
|
