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17th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party & South Asia Srikanth Kondapalli The Chinese Communist Party conducted its national congress from October 15-21, 2007. This Congress, the other previous 16 congresses, have been trend setting events in China, specifically those held after the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Held usually once in five years, these congresses set policy perspectives on various aspects of China, including its foreign policy. Hence these congresses are one of the most significant events in the contemporary history of China. It has ushered into the all-powerful nine member “new” standing committee of the 25-member Politburo, 204-member central committee and 167-member alternate members. In addition, the congress listened to the work report submitted by general secretary of the party — Hu Jintao and has amended the party constitution by including the word “religion” for the first time, besides giving private property equal place with that of the public as private sector contributes to nearly 70 percent of the country’s GDP. Further, the work report legitimises the “go global” strategy of the recent Chinese leadership. The exercise of veto power by the Chinese government on the issue of Burma in early 2007 indicated to the resolve of the Chinese leadership in exercising its new-found influence in the recent period and is a pointer to the events unfolding in near future. Although South Asia has not been explicitly mentioned by the 17th Party Congress, we could glean into the textual and contextual aspects to throw light on the possible impact of the Congress on the Southern Asian region. Overall as the new leadership took over the reins of China for the next five years, it appeared that a twin-track policy of pragmatism and engagement in trade and diplomatic activities could be intensified and, on the other hand, China is concertedly making efforts at strategic domination of the region through several leverages that it had built over a period of time in the South Asian region.
China in the global economy — from integration to dominance? Sriram Natrajan
China’s economy continues to be soar recording a growth rate of 11.4 per cent in 2007 — highest in 14 years — brought about as in the past decade by ever increasing foreign trade. Important developments in 2007 were increases in foreign direct investment, recording close to US $ 75 billion, 47 per cent higher trade surplus compared to 2006 at US $ 262.2 billion and a record increase in foreign exchange reserves- close to US $ 462 billion – bring the total reserves to US $ 1.53 trillion. The impact of such numbers on the domestic economy took the form of inflation at 4.8 per cent - highest in a decade – brought about mainly by the increases in food prices that recorded 12.3 per cent. China has so far managed effectively the three major macroeconomic variables that matter in a globalised system, namely investment rates, inflation and trade balances in the past decade. But price increases in January 2008 were the highest at over 7 per cent despite concerted attempts to reduce credit by monetary measures. Though it is true that China’s growth was robust in the last few years despite slow growth in the US economy, it may not be possible to deduce that a recession there would not affect China’s economic prospects. In other words, a full fledged US recession is most likely to bring down consumption demand that accounts for a large proportion of China’s exports. In addition, the gradual but continuous weakening of the US dollar in recent times in some ways point towards risks to the huge dollar reserves that China has built up. There has also been a relentless pressure from various quarters for an appreciation of the RMB, which the Chinese authorities have effectively resisted allowing only marginal appreciations in the past two years. In the Changing global environment, the next five year will decide which way China is moving.
China’s Military Connection with Pakistan: Case of Arms Supply Dr. Jagannath P. Panda
In terms of arms market, while Asia remains one of the largest in the world, it is often believed that it is China’s weaponisation up-gradation programme and its arms supply to Islamic countries that has become the center of attention and debate for quite sometimes. This is further complicated over the military nexus between China and Pakistan which clearly remains one of the most dangerous strategic faultlines for Asia. However, in the Asian context, the contention of “arms race” may be defined as a competitive acquisition of weapon systems driven by the perceived capabilities of an adversary’s weapon holdings and plans of future acquisition. This complexity of arms race in the region is always clouded over the India-Pakistan-China strategic politics of arms purchase. This paper intends to deal with two contested issues in the overall debate of arms race in Asia: first, the recent arms up-gradation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at different levels which is certainly believed as the prime factor behind the arms race in Asia and; second, PLA’s constant supply of weapons to Pakistan and its implications for India vis-à-vis Asia. These two issues would be discussed by examining few questions like: how far China’s arms supply to Pakistan or the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contributes to this arms race? Will the PLA be able to sustain its “arms race” programme in near future? How should India view the emergence of Chinese military and its transfer of sophisticated weapons to other countries? These are not simply questions, but should be seen rather as valid propositions, which are of significance to the current regional vis-à-vis global security in a larger context.
Sino-Myanmar Relations: Chain of Friendship Paramita Das
China-Myanmar share relations for over 50 years with a temporary period of lull during the time of Cultural Revolution in 1967. Initially the PRC provided all types of assistance and economic aid to the Communist Party of Burma. But with coming of Deng Xiaoping in power there was a total shift in China’s policy towards Myanmar and rapprochement was established with the junta. Myanmar is dependent on the PRC economically, militarily and politically. The legalization of border trade between the two countries in 1988 made it possible for frequent transport of arms and ammunition to Myanmar. The latest gain for China from Myanmar was its winning bid over Shwe gas project which would enable to meet her energy needs. Another area of cooperation between the two is drug trade at the Sino-Myanmar border and AIDS menace. Now it is considered as a security threat for whole of Southeast Asia. ‘Burma Uprising 2007’ is the latest example of Sino-Myanmar friendship and solidarity. As a result the junta would continue to rule as a client state. Myanmar will have to supply more and more mineral products to China in future.
Sino-Afghan Relations since 2001: An Assessment Vishal Chandra Much has been written and is known about the Sino-Afghan relations during the Cold War period, especially China’s conspicuous role in strengthening the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, and about its ‘interactions’ with the Taliban regime. Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, China’s ‘official interaction’ with successive Afghan governments has been relatively low. The United States’ (US) intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 brought about a radical transformation in the regional dynamics. Though China offered full support to the US Administration in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but prospects of a prolonged and a substantial presence of the US-led Western alliance in a neighbouring country soon began to factor in Chinese foreign policy. This article is an attempt to examine the Sino-Afghan relations in the changed political and security environment of the region. As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the international focus largely drifted away from the Afghan politics. The fall of the government of President Muhammad Najibullah in 1992 went almost unnoticed as the world was too engrossed with the huge geo-political transformation that was taking place in the vast Eurasian landmass – fall of the once powerful Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of numerous independent states in Central Asia, southern Caucasus and in the Baltic region. China being a major regional actor was busy coming to terms with new geo-political realities unfolding along its western borders. The inter-mujahideen rivalry that was further consuming Afghanistan (1992-96), at best received the attention of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, especially Pakistan and Iran, and occasionally that of the United Nations (UN). The emergence of a relatively unknown phenomenon called Taliban in southern Afghanistan and the capture of Kabul by the Pakistan-backed Taliban fighters in 1996 gradually began to catch the attention of the regional countries. Chinese attention turned towards Afghanistan as it realized the potential threat from Taliban to its restive western Xinjiang province bordering Afghanistan. Taliban support to the Uighur separatists in the Xinjiang province first made China lean on its ally Pakistan to prevail upon the Taliban against supporting Uighur separatists. At the same time, China engaged the Taliban and offered assistance in rebuilding the infrastructure for them. Unlike Iran, Russia, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and India who began supporting the anti-Taliban coalition, China preferred to engage Taliban at an unofficial level. However, Taliban’s anomalous interpretation of Islam and ways and means of implementing them; coupled with hosting of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and other Islamists from various parts of the world, brought the attention of the world back to the “forgotten war” by the late 1990s. The international spotlight finally turned towards Afghanistan after the tragic events of 9/11 and when the US-led coalition launched the Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 to destroy the Al Qaeda network in the region and the Taliban infrastructure which supported and sheltered them. However, in order to understand the Sino-Afghan relations after 2001, it is pertinent to briefly delve into the history of the relations between the two countries.
China’s Military Odyssey in Africa Sourabh Jyoti Sharma With the world’s largest population and 9 per cent GDP economic boom, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) wants to engage in realpolitik in the second largest resource rich continent i.e. Africa. With its ‘no strings attached’ aid diplomacy to the African nations, China now strategies on building close military ties with them. With its military diplomacy, china wants to achieve its ultimate strategic goal of emerging as the Great Power in a unipolar world dominated and still largely dictated by the US. China rightly thinks that having close military ties along with closer economic relations with major African nations will help realisation of its long cherished goal. Beijing’s military diplomacy in its larger African policy formulations is to achieve twin objectives of economic (access to huge unexplored resources) and political (recognition of ‘One China’ policy in delegitimizing Taiwan its “renegade province”) in the long run. Not surprisingly, China’s renewed military aid offensive with its age old non-conditional aid diplomacy in Africa coincides with the PLA’s strategy of maintaining overall peace and security in the African continent to safeguard Beijing’s vital commercial energy interests from any eventual rivals like the US, EU, Russia and arch-rival India.
“WHY CAN’T CHINA JUST STAY ON AS A GOOD NEIGHBOUR WITH US?” Samudra Gupta Kashyap The article is first hand account of a visit to Arunachal Pradesh in January 2008. It explain in detail the flaws in Chinese claims over Arunachal Pradesh. Though the Chinese burnt most of the land records in Tawang Monastery in 1962 still enough evidence is available to show how the province is part of the Indian Union. The article is originally published in Indian Express in January 2008
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