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Defeat of the LTTE and the Future of Tamil Militancy
Col R Hariharan Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades. Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy. It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession. So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.
Sri Lankan State and its Military Successes Gulbin Sultana On 19 May 2009 President Mahinda Rajapaksa formally announced the military victory of the Sri Lankan state over the LTTE. The article has attributed number of factors which contributed in great measure to the military successes of the Sri Lankan state. This military achievement of the Sri Lankan state shows that if a war against terrorism is fought with strong determination, proper military programme and strategy and solid coordination and cooperation, it is not difficult to militarily eliminate the militant terrorism. However, it is very important to understand that only military solution to terrorism is a short term solution. If the root cause of the terrorism is not addressed and solved on time through political negotiation and consensus, terrorism will re-emerge.
Sri Lanka and the Refugee Crisis S. Murari
The refugees have lost all that is precious to them-- their homes, their near and dear and their hopes for a peaceful and dignified life as equal citizens in Sri Lanka. Integrating them with the society and giving them a sense of belonging to Sri Lanka will be a daunting task. It was surprising that the Sri Lankan Government chose to send back a ship carrying relief materials collected by Tamils in Europe and sent to Colombo for distribution among the refugees. The ship with over 800 tonnes of relief materials, including medicines, had to drop anchor off Chennai harbour. The Sri Lankan Government's unstated objection was that it came from the diaspora and it does not want its citizens to be emboldened to them. A mindset displayed by the Tigers when they turned back thousands of Buddhists who crossed Vavunia with relief materials in a spontanous outpouring of sympathy for the Tamils after the tsunami. Maybe, the Government was put off by the defiant name the ship sported, Vananga Mann( Unconquerable Land).
While the focus of the world is on the Tamils displaced two months ago from the war zone, no one remembers the 90,000 Tamil-speaking Muslims driven out of the north way back in 1990 by the LTTE and who have since been living in refugee camps in Puttalam. They have as much right to their homes as the recently uprooted Tamils. How is the Government going to tackle this problem?
A Roadmap for a Viable Political Settlement to the Sri Lankan Ethnic Issue N. Manoharan
Since the LTTE is no more, which actor should be in a position to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government on behalf of Tamils? The LTTE did not allow or accommodate different political view points. It focussed all its energies on military strategy, but forgot to foment a political strategy. The LTTE also totally failed to cultivate bridges and alliances with other communities of the island i.e. Sinhalese and Muslims. Since the LTTE is gone, the present Tamil political leadership is unconstrained. But the main issue is fragmentation in the Tamil polity. There are three different viewpoints among the Sri Lankan Tamils: pro-government, anti-government, and the one in-between. However, to gain a viable political settlement, it is important that all these three groups are united and negotiate as a single entity keeping in mind the interests of the Tamil community.
Influence of Tamilnadu in India’s Sri Lanka Policy V.Suryanarayan How does one explain the paradigm shift in New Delhi- Chennai equation? Was it due to the “coalition dharma” practiced by the central government, in which the DMK is an important partner? Was it due to Karunanidhi’s keen desire to strengthen his political links with Congress President Sonia Gandhi at a time when sections within the Congress were toying with the idea of a coalition with the AIADMK in the post election scenario? Was the policy dictated by the Chief Minister’s desire to ensure important cabinet berths to his near and dear ones in the Central Government?
Post-Prabhakaran Reconciliation: The Non-LTTE Dimension Sitakanta Mishra The democratic, non-LTTE Tamil groups need to be engaged vigorously and mobilised to reach out the Tamils by addressing their concerns adequately. The challenge before Sri Lanka now is not how to strike a deal with the LTTE as it has been crushed. The real challenge is to dialogue with, heed the concerns of and strike a deal with, the non-LTTE democratic Tamil leaders that are left standing after the operation. Few would accuse the Sri Lankan Government for having failed to strike a deal with the LTTE, but many would certainly blame if Rajapaksa fails to strike a deal with the moderate, non-violent, non-LTTE, Tamil political leaders. Conversely, all along, many of these non-LTTE Tamil groups have contested the very notion of LTTE as the sole representative of Tamil cause. Now when LTTE is grounded, these groups are warranted to prove their credentials by coming up to the occasion and be a part of the reconciliation.
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