January 2010

Indocentric view

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At the backdrop of the strategic reviews conducted by the US military and NATO, a comprehensive Af-Pak strategy was announced by the US President Barack Obama on March 27, 2009 along with a white paper of the inter-agency policy group. The new Obama Administration actually integrated the earlier Bush Administration reviews and transformed those reviews as a broad inter-agency review under Bruce Riedel and Ambassador Holbrooke and Michele Flournoy. The Obama strategy in the first phase outlined how to address the challenges of the downward spiral occurring in Afghanistan. The significant goals of his policy were to disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan to degrade their ability to launch international terrorist attacks; promote a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan; develop self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counter-insurgency with reduced US assistance; and involve the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives. Though Obama talked of an exit strategy he did not mention any time frame for either reduction of troops or for an exit date at that point of time. But the recent historic and improved strategy of Obama’s second phase announcement of December 1, 2009 gave a new dimension to the Af-Pak strategy in the sense; it earmarked deadlines for reduction of troops and withdrawal of troops. We can say that he added military muscle to his strategic policies. As the new concept of Af-Pak signifies a definitive linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the thrust of the anti-terror measures remains sharply focused. In case of Pakistan, it stands as a perplexing country responsible to hold the key to the solution of the vexed Afghanistan problem as it is considered as a part of the problem as well as the solution so far as the issues of terrorism in the region is concerned. A writer in this volume says that a key cornerstone of Obama’s latest Af-Pak policies contained the presence of a sizeable civilian element in the mix with military policies as Obama pointed out in his speech,”…we will work with our partners, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the (Afghan) government can take advantage of improved security.” The same writer says that it is possibly the last chance for change in this volatile terror-infested region. And Obama has already reminded that if the Pakistan Army failed to curb the menace of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces being flushed out from Afghanistan, sovereignty of Pakistan would be a little hinderance for the US to step across the Durand Line in hot pursuit. The writer categorically states that if that happens, it would surely be terminal challenge for Pakistan Army. Moreover, as another writer contends in this issue, the unfolding of future sequence of events in Afghanistan depends largely on the efficacies of US strategies. And as regards India’s concern regarding the power vacuum that might be created in the event of the withdrawal of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, it may be a real worry not only for India but for the South Asian region and the international community as well. The distinctive interpretation of a good Taliban, a bad Taliban and a moderate Taliban still remains a riddle for India, as India has long term stakes in Afghanistan from the point of view of its strategic security. New Delhi G . Kishore Babu January 2010 Editor

United States and the Anti-Terrorist Strategies

Kalim Bahadur

The Afghanistan Soviet-US imbroglio was the last episode of the cold war. It was the United States which promoted terrorism to brow beat the Soviet in Afghanistan. The Jihad against communism was funded and armed by the United States. This led to the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban were armed with the ideology of Osama bin Laden. The United States declared the war against terrorism in reply to the Al Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers in New York. The US strategy to defeat the Taliban was confined to the use of military power. There was no attempt to fight the Taliban ideology and strengthen democratic institutions in Afghanistan. Pakistan had supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, though it was forced to support the US after 9/11. Pakistani agencies, however, continued to keep their links with the Taliban. It was owing to the failure of the US to destroy the flow of funds and recruits to the Taliban that Taliban have been able to stage resurgence. This was greatly helped because of the safe havens provided to them by Pakistan. The US has failed to get the full cooperation from Pakistan in the fight against the Taliban. The US has been trying to put together a strategy for exit. The recent declaration by Obama for a surge of forces in Afghanistan and to begin withdrawal from Afghanistan within 18 months is a move in that direction.

Af-Pak or Pak-Af: Does it matter?

Pinaki Bhattacharya

The Army, as the only viable government institutions, is busy protecting the status quo and its dreams of maintaining its political legitimacy by raising the India bogey. They now find that India’s increasing constructive presence in Afghanistan as an erosion of its much loved ‘strategic depth.’ It thus seeks to block any expansion of that Indian influence – not that India wants to greatly increase its footprint on the rocks of Afghanistan – arguing with the Americans that it is a great hindrance to their full commitment to the eradication of al Qaeda-Afghan Taliban.

What they don’t realise is that South Asia as a habitat of the people of Pakistan is larger than India. If the stability of that region gets permanently endangered, the impact of that on the sovereignty of all countries of the region would be compromised like it has been in West Asia for long.

Pakistan Army’s other tactic to gain control of the operations being conducted by the US-led allied operation is to twist its tail. Since the forces in Afghanistan have long supply lines stretching from the ports of Pakistan, the Army provides security to that. They are now trying to blackmail the operations that a surge in Afghanistan would increase the demands on Pakistan’s troops to take on the retreating Afghan Taliban stragglers. And that would in turn reduce the availability of troops required to secure the supply lines.

This logic was given to Washington by Islamabad prior to the declared surge of 40,000 troops by the Obama administration. The Pakistan elite wanted the Americans to stay in Afghanistan in numbers less than the optimum so that they could continue to bleed while keeping the goodies flowing for Pakistan Army and its fellow travelers.

None of these tactics are working this time for Pakistan. The Americans have realised that the crisis they have created need a long term solution. There are a very few quick fixes. So right after Obama’s ‘Af-Pak’ speech in December 2009, which hinted about an exit in 18 months – by 2011 – his advisers had hit the airwaves with clarifications that it was only a limit drawn in sand. The desired ‘End State’ needs to be reached before any withdrawal could kick in.

The New Af-Pak Strategy and Implications for India

Brig. Vinod Anand

Further, Pakistan ever the duplicitous ally in war against terror would hardly be inspired to abstain from extending support to Afghan Taliban knowing that once the Americans and allies scoot from Afghanistan they would need to business with Taliban. Secondly, it is also being opined that the talk of withdrawal is only meant for domestic consumption where public support for Afghan effort is fast declining. It needs to be remembered that strategic environment in and around Afghanistan is not conducive for a strategic withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan as the resulting situation consequent to American withdrawal could be worse than what is obtaining now. American interlocutors, of late, have been indulging in semantics by asserting that it will be only a drawdown of forces commencing from mid- 2011. Thus it is difficult to predict what would be the nature and character of drawdown of forces in circa 2011.

Pakistan: Perennial Afghan Worry

Prakash Nanda

In his 33-minute address to the American people that day, Obama sought to convince an increasingly skeptical nation that the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the continued existence of Al-Qaeda across the border in Pakistan, what he called a “cancer” on the region, were direct threats to the United States.

He left much unsaid about Pakistan, where the main terrorists he is targetting are located, but where he can send no troops. Obama could not be very specific about his Pakistan strategy, since any overt American presence would only fuel anti-Americanism in a country that reacts sharply to every missile strike against extremists that kills civilians as well, and that fears the United States is plotting to run its government and seize its nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Obama is desperate for Pakistan to do something to contain these elements within its territory. In return, he is pursuing the traditional policy of rewarding Pakistan through military and economic assistance, which over the past seven years has exceeded US$ 12 billion. That Pakistan is not doing the needful and is diverting most of the US aid towards measures against India is another story.

In fact, the fundamental flaw in the US war on terror in Afghanistan happens to be the reliance on and belief in Pakistan. A stable and secure Afghanistan is not in the interest of the forces that run Pakistan today.

Fight against narco-terror: Key to Obama’s Af-Pak success

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury

The Obama Administration should implement an innovative and safe poppy eradication method that previous U.S. governments spent billions of dollars developing. Mycoherbicides are naturally occurring fungi that are used to control such illicit pest plants as the opium poppy and other noxious weeds. Unlike chemical controls now in use, mycoherbicides assail only the targeted plant, rendering its cultivation uneconomical. These fungi continue to live in the soil, preventing the future growth of the opium poppy plant, but are harmless to other crops, to humans and to the environment.

On December 29, 2006, then-President George W. Bush signed Public Law 109/469, of which section 1111requires National Drug Control Policy (the drug czar's office) to conduct an efficacy study of mycoherbicides on the opium poppy and the coca shrub. Yet the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy failed to conduct the one-year study, apparently because it prefers to use pesticides for eradication. Concluding these studies should become a priority for the Obama administration.

The use of mycoherbicides in Afghanistan, combined with adequate enforcement by the military, will mitigate the production of heroin and cut off the terrorists' major money supply. This would free up the $150 to $200 billion now used to fight the drug trade and its byproducts--crime, addiction, diseases, accidents, etc.--in the U.S., and make these funds available to help fight terrorism directly.

Implementing this new strategy, while subsidizing the Afghan economy until other crops and industries can replace the illegal heroin trade, which leaves most Afghans poor, seems a better way for America to succeed in fighting terrorism and endemic corruption. It would also free up resources for an array of social and governmental reforms, which should be clearly defined and strictly supervised. With no heroin to fund terrorism and subvert the economies and political systems of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Afghanistan could be stabilised.