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The G-2 and China-US Relations Rukmani Gupta
The meeting between China’s President Hu Jintao and US President Barack Obama in April 2009, prior to the G-20 summit in London, was seen as the beginning of a “Group of Two” (G-2) by some. Such a format of bilateral interaction between the United States (US) and China, aimed at addressing international economic issues, was first suggested by C. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Bergsten, in an article in Foreign Affairs (July, 2008), had suggested that China was increasingly challenging international rules and institutions but disregarding the impact of this on the global system. According to him, joint leadership of the global economic system by the US and China would be a much better alternative. The idea of G-2 also received support from Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, and Justin Yifu Lin, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the bank, who wrote in an article published in The Washington Post (6 March 2009), “Without a strong G-2, the G-20 will disappoint.”
From interaction focused on economic issues the G-2 special format was seen as being useful in dealing with strategic issues as well. The backing it received from prominent policy makers such as Zbigniew Brezezinski, former US National Security Advisor, and Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, helped popularise the idea.
For the advocates of G-2, international developments – from the global financial crisis to nuclear concerns in Iran and North Korea and issues of climate change – have all necessitated unprecedented cooperation between the United States and China. Without this cooperation, positive outcomes on these global issues would be virtually impossible. The G-2 format would thus facilitate a discussion on not only the bilateral issues between the US and China but also help streamline policies on the more pressing international concerns.
Copenhagen Accord: China’s Role in Climate Diplomacy Rajiv Ranjan
Climate change is the ‘defining challenge of our time’ and a matter of human survival and the development of all countries. It requires cooperation and strong political will, by the international community, to combat the climate change. The Copenhagen Summit, held from 7-18 December 2009, was 15th meeting of the conference of parties to negotiate an agreement, acceptable by all the members, to curb the climate change, under the banner of United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. Unfortunately, the parties failed to deliver any internationally binding agreement to reduce the green houses gas emissions worldwide and to fill the vacuum created by Kyoto Protocol which is scheduled to expire in 2012.
Multilateral Accord, Bilateral Discord: India-China relations in 2009-10 Srikanth Kondapalli
Last couple of years had been crucial for both India and China due to the financial tsunami that lashed the western economies and that of Japan. As both India and China are dependent on the export of their manufactured goods and services to these countries and since consumption shrunk in the latter, sustaining economic growth rates became one of the main challenges. This financial and economic downturn and the necessity to maintain economic growth rates had also influenced Indian and Chinese political/diplomatic policies towards these countries. To overcome the crisis, both coordinated their respective positions at the multilateral fora such as G-20, Brazil-Russia-India-China meetings or at the India-Russia-China meetings. Yet, at the bilateral level, relations between India and China have not achieved an even keel despite some high level political and diplomatic visits between the two countries. While bilateral relations have not reached the levels of open conflict, several indicators in that direction are visible, although this aspect had been assiduously kept under the carpet by both sides. To start with, India and China had cooperated at several multilateral fora in the recent period, with the realisation that collectively they stand to gain vis-ŕ-vis other countries on pressing themes as economic security, energy security and climate change proposals, besides having identical politico-ideological views vis-ŕ-vis the United Nations charter and the like. Both India and China have been active proponents of a number of multilateral initiatives in which both of them have gradually coordinated their respective national positions.
China and South China Sea Territorial Dispute: Is it Sovereignty? S.Rajasimman
This essay attempts to highlight various aspects in Chinese strategic behaviour during the period 1991-2010. This period is unique due to the altered geo-political environment since the break-up of erstwhile Soviet Union in 1989. For Chinese State resides their policy based on a careful study of new emerging realties of international politics. China has in last two decades demonstrated two kinds of behaviour which are inextricably linked and mutually complementary. For, while China strongly opposes a unipolar international political structure, it is not yet strongly challenging it. However during the period 1991-2010 there have been moments of outburst.
In this order of strategic behaviour, the crucial stimulus that has direct bearings on Chinese strategic behaviour is sovereignty. Territorial disputes in general for China (primarily associated with Taiwan and its peaceful reunification) is perhaps intertwined with how China seeks to handle its concerns for sovereignity. It then implies if territorial disputes for China are an intra-national issue or an inter-national issue, for sovereignity is purely an intra-national issue for China. While this essay does not diagnose the issue of sovereignity itself in China during the period 1991-2001, it claims sovereignty and its concerns for China as the crucial variable explaining Chinese strategic behaviour for the mentioned time frame.
In structure this essay is constructed in two parts. The first part establishes the South China Sea dispute primarily associated with sovereignity and only at a secondary level to other factors such as UNCLOS, energy, piracy, terrorism, exploration of hydrocarbons, and regional economy. The second part offers evidences in terms of interpreting events as they have unfolded during 1991-2010 for behaviour as tabulated above. Conclusion being that an assertive China is the measure of the extent it feels as infringement of its sovereignity.
Shanghai Expo 2010 Sriparna Pathak
World expositions have emerged as significant tools of spurring economic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges between nation states. This assumes more importance, particularly in an era when cooperation and mutual benefit have become key components of directing behaviour among states in the international system. The Great Exhibition of Industries of All Nations, held in London in 1851 can be taken to be one of the first of such kind of expos. The Great Exhibition, held at the Crystal Palace, was basically to demonstrate the industrial, military and economic superiority that Britain possessed. Britain, at that time was the dominant industrial and imperial power. It had colonised countries as far away as India and China. In 1851with the signing of the treaty of Nanking, which came about at the end of the first Opium War, China was being drained by foreign capitalism. Around the same time, it was also being drained by feudal rule of the Manchu dynasty. In fact 1851 was the year when the Taiping Rebellion began in China. China’s sole contribution to the Great Exhibition of Industries of All Nations then was just 12 boxes of silk, sent by a Shanghai merchant. Karl Max had deplored the fair as an exercise in capitalist excess. Urumqi Crisis and the Aftermath: The Road Ahead in Xinjiang Bhavna Singh
The long simmering discontent along ethnic cleavages reached a new hilt during the Urumqi crisis. It is a testament of the inefficacy of the Western development strategy, which was propounded by PRC in 2000 to bring about greater integration of the region with the mainland. The crisis exhibits a fundamental constraint in the implementation of the policy guidelines in consonance with the local aspirations and culture. The mass protests for removal of the top Chinese official Wang Lequan in the aftermath of the crisis reflect the intensifying and conscious use of populist measures to hold the government accountable by the locals. The riots also reflect the dilemmas and difficulties that the government faces in controlling the restive far western region despite its continuous strengthening of security and diplomatic efforts and the increasing gulf in social relations due to the ethnic equations.
Changing Dynamics of China’s Energy Security Panu Ongri Pazo
If not creating waves China has already begun causing tremors, as its drive for securing energy resources has begun to shake the world’s energy playing field. On July 19th 2010, the Financial Times quoted the statistics from the 2009 International Energy Agency data which showed China had replaced the US in the world’s energy consumption. The Chinese energy consumption figures stood at 2,252 million tones of oil equivalent (mtoe) in the form of crude, coal, natural gas, nuclear power and other renewable sources. In contrast, the US has consumed 2,189 mtoe during the same period. On the other hand, China’s National Bureau of statistics suggests a lower figure of 2,132 mtoe. Analysts in the IEA suggest that due to the recession, the US had to clamp their economic growth thereby cutting on its energy use. While China was less affected by the recession, its energy consumption remained high, if not growing. Although, the debate about China clinching the top spot may continue till things become more evident, it is important not to catch the shadow and lose the substance.
China-Myanmar Relations: Problems and Prospects Rakesh Puyan Singh
China’s relations with Myanmar must be understood in the wider context of its geostrategic interest in Asia Pacific region. Among other things, economic and security considerations have played major role in determining the nature of its foreign policy towards Myanmar. China’s relations with Myanmar in modern time date back to Myanmar’s official recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 17 December 1949. However, the two countries established diplomatic relations in June 1950 thus crediting Myanmar for being among the first non-socialist countries to recognise the PRC. China’s settlement of boundary with Myanmar in 1960 and the Mutual Non-Aggression Treaty should be analysed in the backdrop of the Cold War international security paradigm and China’s strategic alignment policy in Asia-Pacific Region. Emerging Dynamics of China-Bangladesh-Nepal Relations in South Asia Dr Saurabh
China has been changing in a constantly changing world. Chinese society is being de-politicized. China is now enjoying sustained economic growth, its society is diversifying and the influence of ideology is getting reduced. An old Chinese aphorism alludes to the ever changing nature of things-"Thirty years the East River, Thirty years the West River" (the river is the same but its course changes). Its application runs in the realm of philosophy but equally in Chinese politics and foreign policy. It is also the worth mentioning in context of China-Nepal-India relations that a huge hoarding just outside the Kathmandu airport emblazons the words: ‘Welcome to Nepal, the Gateway to China’. A gentleman in Kathmandu remarked with a smile: “They should have written ‘Welcome to Nepal, China’s Gateway into India’.” The hoarding is a clear sign of intimacy which is developing between Nepal and its northern neighbor, China. China is also giving due importance to Bangladesh in its overall politics of South Asia. The essence of emerging Nepal-China-Bangladesh relations should be anchored in an assessment of the rapid politico-social transformations underway in these countries as well as in South Asia. In recent years, China expended considerable efforts towards modernization and the laying down of groundwork for its future rise. China’s Adaptation to Global Regimes: A Case for Paradigm Shift Dr. Netajee Abhinandan
The post-Cold war period witnessed a perceptible change in China’s attitude towards the role of global regimes in managing conflicts and securing public goods. As China started playing a ‘proactive’ role in international affairs, it joined innumerable international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and regimes in order to facilitate the drive for economic development. The great benefits accrued from the process of economic reforms made China embrace the hitherto proscribed concepts such as the open door, international interdependence, adaptation and integration. The Chinese leadership realized that by fully integrating into the world market and making proper utilization of scientific and technological expertise, the country could attain the status of world power. Globalization soon became a part of Chinese official lexicon and most significantly, national power was now defined in terms of economic strength rather than military strength. Also, there was a significant change in the Chinese perception of international order. It was no more regarded as antithetical or unfair and rather accepted as it was. There was a conscious attempt by the Chinese leaders to play according to the international rules, norms and conventions rather than questioning them. This change reflected through China’s active participation in different multilateral institutions and global regimes. However, China’s increasing involvement in global regimes does not signify any decline in emphasis on principles such as independence and sovereignty of state. For example, the compromises that China made while acceding to WTO, were accepted primarily as a means for advancing specific state interests related to economic modernization. Indeed, Beijing's logic was that the protection of China's sovereignty actually required further reform and opening.
China - Sri Lanka relations: Implications for India’s Security Teshu Singh
Sri Lanka has an enduring, multi-dimensional and deep-rooted relationship with China. The cultural relations between Sri Lanka and China are two thousand year old. Seven major naval expeditions left Nanking for the west in between 1405-1433 and on six occasions the Chinese armada under the command of Admiral Zheng He touched the shores of Hsi-Ian Shan. (Hsi-Ian Shan was the name by which the Chinese knew Sri Lanka during that time).
Cooperation between Central Asia and China Krishnasri Das The Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the erstwhile USSR, the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) emerged as independent sovereign states on the map of the world. These five Central Asian Republics are – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. During the Soviet period the Central Asian Republics did not have direct relations with any country of the world because before 1991, they were part of the former Soviet Union. But with the disintegration of the USSR, Central Asian countries being independent directly established relations with other countries of the world. Since then, China maintained close ties with all countries of the region. China being the immediate and biggest non-CIS neighbor got interested in the region. It is interested in ensuring political stability and preventing Islamic extremism in the region, as this is critically linked to the national security of China. It is also interested in maintaining cooperation and boosting trade relations with the Central Asian republics.
Tibet Factor in India-China Relations Dr. Satish Kumar Tibet remains the decisive factor in shaping the Sino-India relations for the last sixty years. Recently Indian Foreign Secretary Ms Nirupama Rao’s meeting with Dalai Lama in Dharmshala agitated China. Last year the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang had created a lot of heat in the Chinese diplomatic circle though India has maintained a principled stand and stated time and again that Tibet is a part of China. Meeting with Dalai Lama and refugee status of Tibetans living in India has been categorically defined by Indian leaders consistently. Vajpayee during his visit to China in 1979 as the foreign minister explained that the Dalai Lama was given refuge in India purely in reference to his spiritual position. In India, Tibetans were granted refugee status on strictly humanitarian grounds. But China remains apprehensive. Any move of India is looked, explained and understood by China under the shadow of Tibetan cause. Overall India-China relations have been shaped under the currents of Tibetan factor. |
